很多人都認為，在BC省，法官就是法官，並沒有等級之分。 這樣的觀念是錯誤的。 其實，法官不僅有等級之分，不同等級法官開出的法庭令的上訴要求也是不一樣的，這一點對家庭法的客戶來說極其重要。 以下由康健律師為您詳解。
在BC省最高法院中，有兩種法官，一種是Judge，也就是傳統意義上的法官，而另一種是Master，中文翻譯應該為“事務官”。 事務官雖然也有權利庭審並且開出有法律效力的法庭令，其實嚴格來說並不是法官，而是政府為了緩解法官的辦案壓力，特別指派的人員。
法官的權利是非常大的，只要是有相關的法律依據，他們可以辦理大大小小的任何開庭，包括最終庭審（trial）。 對比之下，事務官的權利要小很多，基本上只能開出臨時的、過渡性的法庭令（interim orders），而一般情況下不能開出最終法庭令（final order）。 另外，只有法官能夠聽審最終庭審，事務官是沒有這個權利的。
之所以會安排事務官，是因為他們可以説明法官處理大量的臨時庭審（比如凍結財產、替代傳達令、檔披露、臨時撫養費、贍養費和孩子安排等等），從而可以讓法官可以更專注在最終庭審和其它最終判決上面。
特別注意的是，事務官的判決可以向同級法院（也就是最高法院）的法官來上訴，而法官可以將其推翻; 但是如果是法官的判決的話，就只能到上訴法院來上訴（Court of Appeal），從程式上和法律上來講都要比前者要嚴格很多。
这两者的区别，BC省最高法院在Sidhu v. Hothi, 2014 BCCA 510这个判决中有具体描述：
[22] Like Low J.A. in Ralph’s Auto Supply, I am not minded to meddle with a practice that has worked well and, to all appearances, is still working well. Although some may object to a differentiation between masters and judges as representing a hierarchical system, the fact is that the judicial system is hierarchical by its nature and that masters, who are appointed by the Province under the Supreme Court Act, are not superior court judges. There will always be a distinction in terms of the authority that may under our Constitution be given to masters. As stated by Judson J. in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Victoria Medical Building 1959 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1960] S.C.R. 32:
At first glance, it might be thought that the Legislature, which can authorize a judge to direct a reference in the circumstances mentioned in ss. 67 and 68 of The Judicature Act, could decide that in a particular case there should be no need of delegation but a direct assignment of function with a consequent simplification of civil procedure. But I am satisfied, as was the Court of Appeal, that the assignment of the power of final adjudication to the Master goes beyond procedure and amounts to an appointment of a judge under s. 96 of the British North America Act. The position of the Master as a referee acting under a judge’s order and reporting back to the Court is fundamentally different from his position under the impugned legislation as an independent trier of fact and I think that the Court of Appeal was right in rejecting any analogy between the two positions.
For the same reason, I agree with the Court of Appeal in its decision that s. 31(2) does not save this legislation. ...
While the jurisdiction of the judge is not completely ousted by the Act, it can be sought only if one or other of the litigants chooses to apply for it and it is assumed only in the judge’s discretion. This section leaves untouched the fundamental objection to the legislation that a grant of original jurisdiction to the Master in a case of this kind cannot stand in view of s. 96. [At 44-5.]
(See also Bahcheli v. Yorkton Securites Inc. 2012 ABCA 166 at paras. 12-3.)
[23] Since 1989, the masters’ program has helped to ease the load on Supreme Court judges with respect to procedural matters. Such matters do not generally require the making of substantive findings of fact. Masters are able to make their decisions quickly and efficiently and in the knowledge that if they are wrong, their decisions can be easily corrected, especially where the decision is “vital to the final issue in the case.” Further, as Mr. Godwin submitted, it remains true that various Canadian provinces have adopted different standards of review for masters’ decisions. The fact that the Ontario Court of Appeal has chosen one that is different from ours is not in itself a reason for this province to follow suit. (A division of five judges might well be necessary for a change to be made, since this court has approved the Abermin standard of review in the past: see Fat Mel’s Restaurant Ltd. v. Cdn. Northern Shield Insur. Co. (1993) 1993 CanLII 1669 (BC CA), 76 B.C.L.R. (2d) 231 (C.A.) at para. 13; Chand v. ICBC, 2009 BCCA 559 at para. 34.)
法院系統是非常複雜的，而稍有不慎就有可能造成無法彌補的損失。 如果您有任何家庭法方面的疑問，歡迎您致電我們的中文專線 604 682 6466，我們的專業中文律師團隊會為您竭誠服務。
